ELZABURU Blog - Industrial and Intellectual Property

Tag Archives: Case law

GC confirms that trade mark KERRYMAID cannot be registered in the EU on grounds of the likelihood of confusion with KERRYGOLD

mantequilla, kerrygold, produccion

On 28 June 2011, Kerry Luxembourg Sàrl (“Kerry”) filed the EU trade mark application KERRYMAID (word) for different goods in classes 29 and 30. The Irish company Ornua Co-operative Ltd. (“Ornua”) filed opposition based on 18 earlier marks composed of the sign KERRYGOLD and registered in Classes 1, 5, 29, 30, 32 and 33, invoking Articles 8(1)(b), 8(4) and 8(5) EUTMR.

The Opposition Division upheld the opposition, based on the provisions of Article 8(5) EUTMR, and on the basis of the following trade mark:

kerrygold, logo, vaca, pastar

In December 2013, the applicant lodged an appeal against the Opposition Division’s decision. However, the proceedings before the EUIPO were suspended in light of the infringement action brought before the Spanish courts by Ornua concerning the sale of goods bearing the mark KERRYMAID.

In July 2019, the Board of Appeal ruled on Kerry’s appeal, partially annulling the Opposition Division’s decision and upholding the opposition filed by Ornua on the basis of Article 8(1)(b) EUTMR in respect of all the goods covered by the trade mark applied for, with the exception of “meat, fish, poultry and game” and “preserved, dried and cooked fruits and vegetables” in Class 29. The Board of Appeal concluded that the signs in conflict were similar to an average degree and, therefore, there was a likelihood of confusion in relation to the goods in classes 30 and 29 that were identical or similar to the goods covered by the earlier mark. Moreover, the Board of Appeal held that the peaceful coexistence of the signs in conflict in Ireland and the United Kingdom did not permit the conclusion that there was no likelihood of confusion for the part of the relevant public that is unaware of the geographical reference contained in the term “kerry”.

Kerry’s appeal before the General Court is based on a single plea in law: the alleged infringement of Article 8(1)(b) EUTMR in the Board of Appeal’s decision. Kerry argues that the Board of Appeal erred in concluding that there was a likelihood of confusion between the marks in conflict and it disputes the findings of the Board of Appeal regarding the relevant public’s perception of the geographical name “kerry”, the distinctive character of the earlier mark and the similarity of the signs in conflict.

In its judgment dated 10 March 2021 (T‑693/19), the General Court dismisses Kerry’s appeal and upholds the decision by the EUIPO’s Board of Appeal based on the following findings:

  • Kerry did not put forward any evidence that might call into question the Board of Appeal’s finding that there was no clear indication that the non-English speaking public of mainland Europe would understand the term “kerry” as a geographical indication of the designated goods.
  • Kerry did not furnish any evidence that might call into question the Board of Appeal’s finding that, for the majority of the relevant public, with the exception of the Irish public and possibly the public of the United Kingdom, the term “kerry” included in the earlier mark had distinctive character in relation to the goods for which the mark was registered.
  • Even if it could be considered that the relevant public as a whole would perceive the term “kerry” as a geographical indication when used in relation to the goods covered by the earlier mark, the Board of Appeal’s finding that the word element “kerrygold” is the dominant element of the earlier mark would not be called into question, given that, contrary to Kerry’s contention, said finding was not based solely on the presence of the term “kerry” in the word element “kerrygold” but on the position and size of said element and the lack of distinctive character of the figurative elements of the earlier mark.
  • The Board of Appeal did not err in not considering the figurative elements of the earlier mark to be the dominant and distinctive elements of that mark, given that, as held by the Board of Appeal, the representation of a grazing cow that features in the earlier mark, in relation to milk products, will be perceived by consumers as an element that is descriptive of the nature of the designated goods, and the other figurative elements of the sign (the flowers, the green background, the white lines and the font used) will be perceived as purely decorative elements that cannot convey any message that can be remembered by consumers.
  • The signs at issue are visually and phonetically similar to an average degree due to the common element “kerry”, placed in the first part of the word elements of the signs. Therefore, the Board of Appeal rightly concluded that, even though the signs in dispute are not conceptually similar, they are similar overall.
  • In light of the foregoing, the Board of Appeal rightly concluded that, in the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion, in the case at hand, with regard to the goods covered by the mark applied for which are similar or identical to the goods in Class 29 covered by the earlier mark, there may be a likelihood of confusion for the part of the relevant public which is not aware of the geographical reference contained in the term “kerry” and which corresponds to a large part of the relevant public.

In relation to the objections raised by Kerry concerning the Board of Appeal’s analysis of the likelihood of confusion, the General Court holds as follows:

  • The examination of the likelihood of confusion carried out by the EUIPO necessarily entails an abstract assessment, which is based not on the circumstances in which the goods are marketed, but on the “objective” arrangements for the marketing of the goods covered by the marks in conflict and, therefore, the way in which the earlier mark is used is irrelevant for the purposes of analysing the likelihood of confusion and the Board of Appeal was not obliged to take into consideration the evidence invoked by Kerry.
  • In any case, even if taking that evidence into consideration would have enabled the Board of Appeal to conclude that the term “kerry” had Irish connotations for the relevant public, mere connotations cannot suffice to determine that the relevant public as a whole perceives the term “kerry” as a geographical indication when it is used in relation to the goods covered by the earlier mark, given that to make that determination it would be necessary for there to be a sufficiently direct and specific link between the sign and the goods to enable the relevant public to immediately perceive, without further thought, a description of the goods in question or of one of their characteristics.
  • The judgment by the Court of Justice of 7 January 2004, Gerolsteiner Brunnen (C-100/02, EU:C:2004:11), invoked by Kerry, is not applicable to the case at hand, given that on reading the judgment, it does not appear that the Court of Justice examined whether the term “kerry”, associated with the goods in question, would be understood by the relevant public as an indication of their geographical origin.
  • The Board of Appeal did not err in disregarding the judgments of the Provincial Appellate Court of Alicante and the EU Trade Mark Court issued in the infringement proceedings brought by Ornua, given that the EUIPO is not bound by the decisions of an EU trade mark court delivered in actions for infringement, in the context of the exercise of its exclusive jurisdiction over registration of EU trade marks and, in particular, when, in so doing, it examines oppositions filed against applications to register EU trade marks.
  • With regard to the alleged peaceful coexistence of the marks at issue, contrary to Kerry’s claims, the burden of proof lies with the party claiming that there is peaceful coexistence and, moreover, when the opposition to the registration of an EU trade mark is based on an earlier EU trade mark, the coexistence must be proved for the entire territory of the European Union.

In light of the above, the General Court concludes that the Board of Appeal correctly held that there was a likelihood of confusion on the part of the non-English speaking part of the relevant public between the mark applied for and the earlier mark, within the meaning of Article 8(1)(b) EUTMR, in relation to the goods at issue.

Author: Ana Sanz

Visit our website

Mahou wins “Radler Cinco Estrellas” battle against Heineken

La primera Radler Cinco Estrellas, publicidad mahou, cartelera

The court dismissed Heineken’s claim, finding that the advertising of the Spanish brand defended by ELZABURU was not misleading and did not constitute unfair competition.

Judgment no. 9/2021, of 18 January 2021, by Section 28 of the Provincial Appellate Court of Madrid upheld the dismissal of the unfair competition complaint lodged by Heineken against its competitor Mahou in relation to the advertising for the launch of Mahou Cinco Estrellas Radler in the summer of 2018.

The advertisements in that campaign launching the new product included the phrases “La primera Radler Cinco Estrellas” and “La primera Radler Cinco Estrellas con zumo natural de limón”, together with the image of the bottle or can of the beer in question.

Anuncia Radler Cinco Estrellas, Mahou


In its complaint, Heineken argued that the words “la primera” [“the first”] within the phrase could only be interpreted in two ways: in a chronological sense, as the first “Radler” [shandy] type beer to launch in the marketplace, or in the sense of superior quality, with respect to the rest of the “Radler” type beers. Given that, according to Heineken, neither interpretation was accurate, it would constitute misleading advertising, as prohibited under Articles 5 and 7 of the Unfair Competition Act.

However, the message conveyed by the disputed advertising was different to the only two interpretations put forward by the complainant. The prominent image of the Mahou beer bottle or can, with its famous Mahou Cinco Estrellas trademark on the front, informed the consumer targeted by the advertisement that it was the first ever “Radler” type beer or beer with lemon launched by the brand in the marketplace. Therefore, the advertisement did have a chronological meaning, but it was relative rather than absolute, and it was specifically with reference to Mahou’s well-known Cinco Estrellas beer.

This was the finding of both Mercantile Court No. 12 in Madrid, in the first instance ruling, and the Provincial Appellate Court in the appeal. Both courts applied the principle established in settled case law that advertisements must be considered as a whole to determine whether they may be misleading.

The analysis put forward by Heineken, which excluded the main visual element of the advertisement (the image of the advertised beer), was flawed, leading to a distorted interpretation of the message conveyed.

The conclusion drawn in the court’s ruling was supported, moreover, by a market study submitted in the proceedings by Mahou in which only 3% of the respondents spontaneously interpreted the advertisement in one of the ways suggested by Heineken, compared with the 20% of respondents who understood it as advertising for the Mahou brand’s first “Radler” type beer.

Access the article published in Expansión Jurídico [in Spanish].

Author: Carlos Morán

Visit our website

Lidl convicted in Spain of infringement of a European patent held by Vorwerk, manufacturer of the popular Thermomix kitchen appliance


Mercantile Court No. 5 in Barcelona issued a judgment on 19 January 2021, accepting in full the patent infringement claim lodged by the German company Vorwerk against Lidl Supermercados, the Spanish subsidiary of the German retailer Lidl.

The patent concerned is a European patent, validated in Spain, which protects some of the innovative technical features of the famous Thermomix kitchen appliance. The infringement involved the importation and sale in Lidl’s stores in Spain of a kitchen appliance under the brand Silvercrest, known commercially as Monsieur Cuisine Connect. This appliance is manufactured in Germany by another company.


Lidl contested the complaint, denying the infringement and filing a counterclaim seeking the invalidity of the patent. The counterclaim action was based, firstly, on the grounds for invalidity relating to added subject-matter. According to Lidl, during its prosecution at the European Patent Office, Vorwerk’s patent had been modified in such a manner that technical features that were not present in the original application were included in the first claim. However, in the court’s view, these features were implicit in the original description of the patent. Thus, a person skilled in the art would have considered them directly and unequivocally included in the same.

Lidl also questioned the patent’s inventive step, arguing that the technical features of the first claim would be obvious to a person skilled in the art based on the state of the art at the time the application was filed and several earlier patents protecting kitchen appliances held by Braun and Philips, among other companies.

The court also rejected these grounds for invalidity, applying the problem-solution approach in its analysis, in accordance with the practice of the European Patent Office and specialised courts. It thus concluded that a person skilled in the art would not have arrived at the technical solution offered by Vorwerk’s patent based on the combination of the earlier patents, given that none of them suggested or posed the technical challenge of creating a kitchen appliance which, in addition to processing or mixing foods, could also weigh them by means of the independent activation of both functions.

Having confirmed the validity of Vorwerk’s patent, the court examined the infringement of the patent by Lidl’s appliance. In this regard, the debate in the proceedings centred on whether the Monsieur Cuisine appliance incorporates the safety function that prevents intervention inside the mixing bowl while it is in operation. In light of the parties’ expert reports, the court found that this feature, as claimed in the patent, is present in Lidl’s appliance, along with the rest of the technical features included in the first claim.

Consequently, the judgment accepted all of the petitions set out in Vorwerk’s complaint, including the petitions to cease selling the infringing appliance and withdraw it from the market, and to pay compensation for damages sustained, the amount of which will be set at the enforcement stage when the judgment becomes final.

The judgment is not final and may be appealed by Lidl before the Provincial Appellate Court of Barcelona.


Author: Carlos Morán

Visit our website


The Court of Justice rules for the first time on the prohibition concerning registration of a trademark filed by an agent

Edificio del palacio de justicia

The Court of Justice issued a judgment on 11 November 2020 (C-809/18 P; MINERAL MAGIC) in which it had the opportunity, for the first time, to establish the requirements that must be fulfilled for application of Article 8(3) of the Regulation on the European Union Trademark (EUTMR).

This precept, which has its origin in Article 6septies of the Paris Convention, concerns the case where an agent (person linked commercially with the proprietor of a foreign trademark) applies in his own name for the trademark of said proprietor without the proprietor’s consent. This is known informally as the case of the “unfaithful agent”.

Edificio del palacio de justicia  

The background to the dispute leading to the judgment in question can be summarised as follows. The UK company JOHN MILLS filed an application for the European Union trademark MINERAL MAGIC to cover a range of goods in class 3. Prior to the application, there was a distribution agreement between JOHN MILLS and the US company JEROME ALEXANDER CONSULTING in relation to goods sold under the designation MAGIC MINERALS BY JEROME ALEXANDER. Having become aware of the filing of the mark MINERAL MAGIC, the US company filed an opposition invoking the application of Article 8(3) EUTMR. They cited, among others, the existence of the registered US trademark MAGIC MINERALS BY JEROME ALEXANDER also covering goods in class 3.

The main issue already addressed in the proceedings before the EUIPO was whether Art. 8(3) EUTMR was applicable when, as in this case, the word designations of the EU mark and the US mark were not completely identical, and the goods covered by the respective marks were not identical either (at least not completely).

Since the dual conditions of identical marks and identical goods were not present, the EUIPO’s Opposition Division rejected the US company’s arguments. However, the subsequent appeal was accepted by the EUIPO’s First Board of Appeal and the mark MINERAL MAGIC was thus refused. The Board of Appeal adopted a flexible interpretation of the provisions of Article 8(3) EUTMR, finding that they could also be applied when the marks in dispute are similar either in respect of the marks or the goods covered.

JOHN MILLS lodged an appeal, which was accepted by the General Court in a judgment dated 15 October 2018 (T-7/17). The General Court essentially adopted a literal interpretation of Article 8(3) EUTMR, which refers to “the trademark”, meaning that, in the opinion of the General Court, the foreign mark and the mark applied for must be the same and, therefore, identical. Moreover, in support of its view, the General Court referred to the preparatory work carried out for the drafting of Regulation 40/94 on the Community trademark. This included a document which expressly indicated that the suggestion of a delegation that the provision concerned should also apply in cases of ‘similar’ trademarks for ‘similar’ goods, had not been adopted. For the General Court, since the wording of Article 8(3) is so clear, there was no need to use other interpretative sources, such as, for example, Article 6septies of the Paris Convention. Consequently, it held that since there was only a mere similarity between the marks in conflict, the conditions for application of Article 8(3) EUTMR were not present.

The Court of Justice, on the other hand, considered that for the application of Article 8(3) EUTMR, it is essential to take into account Article 6septies of the Paris Convention, since the European Union is a member of the World Trade Organization and, as such, is obliged to adhere to the TRIPS Agreement which, in turn, provides that members shall comply with Articles 1 to 12 of the Paris Convention.

While the Court of Justice recognises that in the French-language version (which is the authentic version) of Article 6septies of the Paris Convention the expression ‘cette marque’ is used in reference to the earlier mark, it nevertheless studies the background to the provision. In this regard, the Court of Justice states that in the Acts of the Conference of Lisbon of 1958 (the Conference where the provision was introduced) it is indicated that a trademark applied for by the agent or representative of the proprietor of the earlier mark may also be covered by that provision where the mark applied for is similar to that earlier mark.

Thus, the Court of Justice does not assume that Article 8(3) EUTMR (and its originating provision, Article 6septies of the Paris Convention) only applies where the dual conditions of identical marks and identical goods/services are present and it acknowledges that, in principle, it can also be applied in cases of “similarity”. And in this regard (and for me this argument is very convincing) the Court of Justice clearly states that “if Art. 8(3) EUTMR were only applied in cases where the marks at issue are identical (also including where the goods and/or services are identical), such an interpretation would have the effect of calling into question the general scheme of the European Union Trademark Regulation in that it would result in the proprietor of the foreign mark being deprived of the possibility of opposing, on the basis of Article 8(3), the registration of a similar mark by his agent or representative, even though the agent or representative, following such registration, would be entitled to file opposition, pursuant, in particular, to Article 8(1)(b), against the application for subsequent registration of the initial mark by that proprietor on the ground of its similarity to the mark registered by the agent or representative of that proprietor”.

On the basis of these arguments, the Court of Justice upheld the appeal and even addressed the substance of the matter, finding that in this case the requirements for application of Article 8(3) EUTMR were fulfilled and, therefore, the marks could not be permitted to coexist.

We can therefore conclude that this judgment is of great importance, given that it confirms the necessary conditions for the proprietor of a foreign trademark to be able to prevent the registration of a later mark applied for by his agent or representative. In summary, we can say that the conditions, which are cumulative, are the following.

  1. The first condition is that, specifically in countries where trademarks are acquired through registration, the person intending to exercise his right must be the proprietor of a trademark in a country that is party to the Paris Convention or a member of the World Trade Organization.
  3. The second condition is that a commercial relationship must have existed between the applicant and the proprietor of the earlier mark prior to the filing of the contested mark. In this regard, there is agreement that the terms “agent” or “representative” are to be interpreted broadly, including, for example, distributors, as in the case concerned in this judgment.
  5. As for the final requirement, on which this judgment has provided clarification, it is not essential for the dual conditions of identical marks and identical goods/services to be present. The provision may also be applied in cases where there is similarity between the marks and similarity in the goods or services claimed by the respective marks.

If these requirements are fulfilled, Article 8(3) EUTMR and Article 6septies of the Paris Convention shall apply,unless, as specified in those legal provisions, the agent is able to justify his actions or has authorisation (which I understand must be express authorisation) from the proprietor of the foreign mark.


Author: Jesús Gómez Montero; Former Partner of Elzaburu and Member of the Advisory Board of the Alberto Elzaburu Foundation

Visit our website


Ultimate victory for MESSI over MASSI

Victoria definitiva de MESSI sobre MASSI

When it seemed that Lionel Messi had finally ceased to be newsworthy after an eventful summer, on 17 September 2020, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJ) handed down its judgment in cases C-449/18 y C-474/18 on the appeals lodged by the EUIPO and J.M.- E.V. e hijos S.R.L. against the judgment of the General Court (GC).

As a recapitulation of what we already commented at the time, in 2011 the F.C. Barcelona player Lionel Messi filed European Union trademark application no. 010181154, with the following design, at the EUIPO to cover goods in classes 9, 25 and 28:

Logo Messi

As a consequence of said application, the owner of the earlier European Union trademarks nos. 3436607 and 414086 MASSI (word), registered in classes 25 and 9 and 28 respectively, filed opposition on the grounds that there was a likelihood of confusion and/or association (Article 8.1 EUTMR) between the trademark filed by Leo Messi and the earlier MASSI marks.

The EUIPO issued its decision, accepting in full the opposition filed by the owner of the MASSI marks and thus refusing Leo Messi’s application, on the basis that there was a likelihood of confusion between the marks in dispute. As a result, in 2014 Lionel Messi lodged an appeal against the refusal, but the EUIPO dismissed the appeal.

The applicant decided to contest the decision and, in September 2014, he lodged an appeal with the GC on grounds that the marks MESSI and MASSI were perfectly able to coexist on the Register, as the EUIPO had not taken into account the importance of the conceptual aspects when analysing the matter.

The GC accepted the appeal on 28 April 2018, granting the European Union trademark in question, a decision that was appealed both by the EUIPO and J.M.- E.V. e hijos S.R.L.

The CJ has ruled on this, confirming the GC’s findings of 2018, establishing as follows:

  1. In case C-449/18 P (EUIPO), it is ruled that the GC duly took into consideration the perception of the marks MESSI and MASSI by the entire relevant public, when analysing the likelihood of confusion, and not only part of this as argued by the EUIPO. In the opinion of the CJ, this is due to an erroneous interpretation by the appellant of the judgment issued by the GC.
  2. With regard to case C-474/18 P (J.M.- E.V. e hijos S.R.L.), the Court of Justice points out that, in the same way as the reputation of the earlier mark, the possible renown of the person applying to register his name as a trademark is one of the relevant factors to be taken into account when assessing the likelihood of confusion, insofar as that renown may influence the perception of the mark by the relevant public (CJEU ruling of 24 June 2010, Becker/Harman International Industries, C-51/09 P, EU:C:2010:368, paragraph 37). This means that the GC rightly found that the renown of Lionel Messi constituted a relevant factor to establish a difference between the terms “messi” and “massi” on the conceptual front.
  3. Similarly, with regard to the appellant’s allegation that the GC based its ruling on facts and evidence submitted for the first time before the GC, the CJ states that the renown enjoyed by Lionel Messi already formed part of the subject-matter of the proceedings before the EUIPO.

Moreover, the CJ goes on to add that the GC rightly stated that, since the renown of the Messi surname – in reference to the world famous football player and public figure – was well known, it could be known by anyone or it could be found out easily through sources that are readily accessible. These sources were available to the EUIPO when it issued its decision and should have been considered by the EUIPO when it analysed the similarity of the marks MESSI and MASSI from the conceptual standpoint.

  1. Finally, the CJ finds that the appellant interpreted the Ruiz Picasso and others/OHIM (C-361/04 P) judgment erroneously, as its brief of appeal maintained that the GC stated that, under certain circumstances, the conceptual differences can offset the visual and phonetic similarities between the signs in question.

In this regard, the CJ reminds us that a global assessment of the likelihood of confusion implies that the conceptual differences between two signs can offset the visual and phonetic similarities between them, provided that at least one of these signs has a clear and specific meaning from the relevant public’s point of view, in such a way that it can be perceived immediately by said public. Therefore, since the relevant public would perceive the marks in conflict (MESSI and MASSI) as two conceptually different signs, the application of the Ruiz Picasso and others/OHIM (C-361/04 P) judgment was correct.

The message put forward by the CJ in this case – which we believe to be correct – is clear as, independently of the visual and phonetic similarities between two marks, there may not be a likelihood of confusion if there is a marked differentiation on the conceptual front and, thus, Article 8.1 b) would not be applicable.

In this case, said marked difference on the conceptual front is based on the renown of the Argentinian star player’s surname among the relevant public, a well-known fact that should be considered in order to permit the later mark to be granted registration despite the existence of earlier MASSI marks. It seems clear that if Messi’s surname were not well known, the marks MESSI and MASSI would be unable to coexist and, therefore, the subject trademark application should have been refused.

The question we should address now is whether the CJ’s arguments are applicable to cases in which the applicant’s mark is not a personality, but rather a mark that is already widely known and recognised by the relevant public as a result of its use in the marketplace. In other words, could the reputation of a mark be considered a well-known fact by the EUIPO, where the distinctiveness acquired by the mark under application must be considered a relevant factor when analysing the likelihood of confusion with respect to earlier marks?

It remains to be seen what direction EUIPO practice will take in this regard.

Author: Manuel Mínguez

Published previously in Economist & Jurist [in Spanish]

Visit our website




Formulario de suscripcion

Sí, soy humano*

Se ha enviado un mensaje de confirmación; por favor, haga clic en el enlace de confirmación para verificar su suscripción.
Este email ya está en uso
Debes escribir un email válido
Debes cliquear el captcha
El captcha no es correcto